Let C be a (fan-in 2) Boolean circuit of size s and depth d, and let x be an input for C. Assume that a verifier that knows C but doesn't know x can access the low degree extension of x at one random point. Two competing provers try to convince the verifier that C(x) = 0 and C(x) = 1, respectively, and assume that one of the provers is honest.
INTRODUCTION
The model of refereed games, or, interactive proofs with competing provers, was first introduced by Feige, Shamir and Tennenholtz [4] . Informally, given a language L and an input x, an efficient verifier interacts (that is, exchanges private messages) with two computationally-unbounded provers in order to decide whether or not x ∈ L. One prover tries to convince the verifier that x ∈ L, while the other prover tries to convince the verifier that x / ∈ L. (The assumption is that the prover who is right is honest and follows the protocol, while the other is untrusted). The seminal paper of Feige and Kilian [3] shows that the class of languages with a single round refereed games is exactly PSPACE, and the class of languages with poly(n) rounds refereed games is exactly EXP.
Let C be a (fan-in 2) Boolean circuit of size s and depth d, and let x be an input for C. Assume that a verifier that knows C but doesn't know x can access the low degree extension of x at one random point. The verifier tries to decide whether or not x satisfies C. Two competing provers try to convince the verifier that C(x) = 0 and C(x) = 1, respectively, and, as before, assume that one of the provers is honest.
Problems of this type in the model of interactive proofs with a single prover were studied in [6, 5] . In particular, the beautiful paper of Goldwasser, Kalai and Rothblum [5] gives a protocol where the prover convinces the verifier in the correct value of C(x) (with small probability of error), and where the number of rounds and the communication complexity are both d · polylog (s), and the complexity of the prover is poly(s). Moreover, maybe the most interesting aspect of their protocol is that if in addition one assumes that the circuit C is log(s)-space uniform, the complexity of the verifier in the protocol is d · polylog (s). That is, the complexity of the verifier may be significantly smaller than the size of the circuit. In other words, the computation was delegated to the prover, while the verifier is still convinced that the computation is correct.
Our Results
As before, let C be a (fan-in 2) Boolean circuit of size s and depth d, and let x be an input for C. Assume that a verifier that knows C but doesn't know x can access the low degree extension of x at one random point. Two competing provers try to convince the verifier that C(x) = 0 and C(x) = 1, respectively.
For any r ≥ 1, we give an r rounds protocol with communication complexity d 1 r polylog (s) that convinces the verifier in the correct value of C(x) (with small probability of error). In particular, when we allow only one round, the protocol exchanges d · polylog (s) bits, and when we al-
rounds, the protocol exchanges only polylog (s) bits. Moreover, the complexity of the verifier and (honest) provers in this protocol is poly(s), and if in addition the circuit is log(s)-space uniform, the complexity of the verifier is d 1 r polylog (s). The protocol is obtained by combining the delegation protocol of Goldwasser, Kalai and Rothblum [5] and the competing provers protocols of Feige and Kilian [3] , together with some new techniques.
We have learnt that a result similar to ours for the case r = 1, as well as the motivation of delegating computation to competing clouds, was independently obtained by Canetti, Riva and Rothblum [2] .
Delegating Computation to Competing Clouds
As mentioned above, the main motivation behind the protocol of Goldwasser, Kalai and Rothblum [5] was delegating computation to a cloud: Consider the case of log-space uniform circuits. As mentioned above, the complexity of the verifier in this case is relatively small, assuming that she has access to the low degree extension of x at a random point. Moreover, even if the verifier doesn't have access to the low degree extension of x (but rather knows x), she can compute the low degree extension of x at a random point by herself in almost linear time, which can be significantly smaller than the size of the circuit. Thus, the computation was delegated to the prover, while the verifier is convinced (with high probability) that the computation was performed correctly.
Using our new protocol, a verifier can delegate computation to two (or more) competing clouds, viewing each cloud as a separate prover. If at least one of the clouds is reliable, the verifier will be able to identify the correct answer and trust that the computation is correct (with high probability). The advantage over the protocol of [5] is that the communication complexity and the number of rounds in our protocol are significantly lower.
Communication Complexity with Competing Provers and Circuit Lower Bounds
Aaronson and Wigderson [1] suggested the model of communication complexity with two competing provers.
Recall that the standard setting of communication complexity involves two separated, computationally-unbounded players, Alice and Bob, each holding a private n-bit input string. Assume that Alice holds x ∈ {0, 1} n and Bob holds y ∈ {0, 1} n . Let f : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function known to both Alice and Bob, and let x•y ∈ {0, 1} 2n denote the concatenation of x and y. The players' mutual goal is to compute f (x • y) with the least amount of communication between them.
In the model of communication complexity with competing provers the players may communicate, via private channels, with two provers that are assumed to know f , as well as both x and y. The two provers try to convince the players that f (x•y) = 0 and f (x•y) = 1, respectively. The communication complexity of a protocol is the total number of bits exchanged between all the parties (players and provers). In this paper we are interested in both the number of rounds and the communication complexity of the suggested protocols.
By scaling down the competing provers protocols of [3] , Aaronson and Wigderson showed that strong enough lower bounds for the communication complexity of f , in this model, imply lower bounds for the computational complexity of f . More precisely, they show that for any language L ∈ P there are protocols in this model with poly-logarithmic rounds and communication complexity, and for any language L ∈ LOGSPACE there are one-round protocols with poly-logarithmic communication complexity.
Our results strengthen this connection and relates the communication complexity of f in this model to the circuit complexity of f .
More precisely, our results imply that if f can be computed by a Boolean circuit of size s and depth d then for any r ≥ 1 there is an r rounds protocol for f , in this model, with communication complexity d 1 r polylog (s). In particular, as before, when we allow only one round, the protocol exchanges d · polylog (s) bits, and when we allow r =
rounds, the protocol exchanges only polylog (s) bits.
This can be viewed as a possible direction towards proving circuit lower bounds. For instance, in order to prove f / ∈ N C, it suffices to show that any one-round protocol for f , in this model, requires the exchange of ω (polylog (n)) bits. The one-round case is very appealing as it gives a relatively simple combinatorial condition that implies strong circuit lower bounds.
We also consider the model of communication complexity with one prover, where a single prover tries to convince the players that f (x, y) = 1. We observe that the result of [5] (combined with the approach of [1] 
OUR SETTINGS
We study the query complexity and communication complexity settings in the presence of (untrusted) provers. In this section we present the formal settings used in the paper.
We start by reviewing the standard query and communication complexity settings (Subsection 2.1).
We present a generalized framework for interaction between players and provers, called general communication protocols (Subsection 2.2). We describe the settings for query and communication complexity with provers (Subsections 2.3 and 2.4). Finally, we discuss the relations between query and communication complexity with provers (Subsection 2.5).
Let Fn be the set of Boolean functions on n bits, Fn = {f | f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}}.
Query and Communication Complexity

Query Complexity
In the query complexity setting, we are given a function f ∈ Fn and an input x ∈ {0, 1} n . We are then asked to compute f (x) by reading the least number of bits from x.
Communication Complexity
The communication complexity setting involves two separated, computationally-unbounded players, Alice and Bob, that attempt to evaluate a function f ∈ F2n known to both. Alice receives a private n-bit string x, and Bob receives a private n-bit string y. Let x • y ∈ {0, 1} 2n denote the concatenation of the strings x and y. The goal is for one of the players (for concreteness, say Alice) to compute and output f (x • y), with the least amount of communication between them.
General Communication Protocols
We consider the setting in which a set of players and provers, each holding a private input (bit-string), communicate. A general communication protocol (GCP) prescribes a probabilistic strategy to each participant. During the execution of the protocol, any player may exchange messages (bit-strings) with any of the other players or provers through a private channel. We assume that there is no communication among provers.
At the end of the protocol the first player must output a value in {0, 1, ⊥}. Informally speaking, this value should be the result of the evaluation of a Boolean function on the participants' inputs. A 0 or 1 output is interpreted as the actual value of the function, while ⊥ indicates that one of the provers did not follow his prescribed strategy.
A GCP proceeds in rounds. Each round consists of three sets of messages sent in the following order (messages may be empty):
1. Players send questions: Each player sends a message (question) to each of the provers.
Provers reply:
Each prover sends a message (answer) to each of the players.
3. Players interact: Each player sends a message to each of the other players, according to some pre-specified order.
The communication complexity of a GCP is defined as the maximal number of bits exchanged by all the involved parties (provers and players) in any execution. An (r, c)-GCP is a GCP with at most r rounds, and communication complexity at most c.
Query and Communication Complexity with Provers
Next, we formally define the settings used in the paper. We define two variants of the query complexity model, called QCP and QCCP, as well as the two variants of the communication complexity model, called CCP and CCCP.
In the CCP and CCCP models, the players attempt to compute the value of a function f ∈ F2n on an input x • y ∈ {0, 1} 2n . We assume that the prover(s) know both x and y, while Alice only has x, and Bob only has y.
In the QCP and QCCP models, the player attempts to compute the value of a function f ∈ Fn on an input x ∈ {0, 1} n . We assume that the prover(s) have the input x, while the player has an oracle access to a (possibly a more "elaborated") version of x. That is, the player has access to a string y = g (x), where g is a function that possibly "stretches" x. We mention that in this paper g (x) will always be the low-degree extension of x (see Subsection 2.4).
In the QCP model, we require the player to output one of the values f (x) or ⊥ with probability at least 1−ϵ, regardless of the behavior of the prover (that is, the player is only allowed to make a mistake with probability at most ϵ). If the prover is truthful (i.e., follows the prescribed strategy), we require the player to always output f (x). The requirements for the CCP model are similar.
In the QCCP model, we assume that at least one of the provers is truthful (i.e., follows the prescribed strategy), and require the player to output f (x) with probability at least 1 − ϵ, regardless of the behavior of the other prover. Note that, without loss of generality, we may assume that one prover tries to convince the player that f (x) = 1, while the other tries to convince the player that f (x) = 0. The requirements for the CCCP model are similar.
For the rest of the section let ϵ ∈ [0, 1], n, r, c, q, ℓ ∈ N, F be a field, and g : {0,
is the set of functions f ∈ Fn that can be computed by an (r, c)-GCP between a player and a prover, in the following sense: The prover is given an input x ∈ {0, 1} n , while the player is given the input y = g (x).
For any strategy of the prover, a player who follows the protocol reads at most q symbols from y and, with probability at least 1 − ϵ, outputs either f (x) or ⊥. If the prover also follows the protocol, then the player always outputs f (x). n , while the player is given the input y = g (x).
Definition 2 (CCP
Assume that for any fixed f and x, one of the provers, whose identity maybe unknown to the player, always follows the protocol. That is, this prover runs the probabilistic strategy prescribed to him by the protocol. Then, for any strategy of the other prover, a player who follows the protocol reads at most q symbols from y and, with probability at least 1 − ϵ, outputs f (x).
Definition 4 (CCCP). CCCPϵ (r, c) is the set of functions f ∈ F2n, that can be computed by an (r, c)-GCP between two players, Alice and Bob, and a pair of provers, in the following sense: Alice is given the input x ∈ {0, 1}
n and Bob is given the input y ∈ {0, 1} n , while both provers are given x • y.
Assume that for any fixed f , x and y, one of the provers, whose identity maybe unknown to the players, always follows the protocol. That is, this prover runs the probabilistic strategy prescribed to him by the protocol. For any strategy of the other prover, if both players follow the protocol, Alice outputs f (x • y) with probability at least 1 − ϵ.
Low Degree Extension (LDE)
Recall that in the QCP and QCCP models, the prover(s) have an input x, while the player has access to y = g (x). As mentioned before, in this paper, g (x) is always the lowdegree extension of x. In this subsection we define the function g (x) = LDE (x), that maps x to its low-degree extension.
Let H = {0, ..., h − 1} be a set and
, and has degree at most h − 1 in each of its m variables. We sometimes refer to x andx as truth 
Connection Between Query and Communication Complexity with Provers
The following observation made by [1] shows that results for the query complexity model (with g (x) = LDEs (x)) imply analogous results for the communication complexity model. More precisely, in the communication complexity setting, any point in the low degree extension of the concatenated input x • y, can be computed by the players by the exchange of a single field element.
Let S be a set, and let c ∈ N. Consider the simple generalization of the standard communication complexity setting that allows Alice and Bob to exchange symbols from the set S (instead of just bits). We denote by CCS (c) the class of all functions f : {0, 1}
2n → S that can be computed by having Alice and Bob exchange at most c elements of S.
The proof of Proposition 5 follows easily by the fact that low degree extension is a linear function.
We say that a QCP or a QCCP protocol is non-adaptive if the queries to y = g (x) made by the player only depend on the player's random string. We mention that protocols presented in this paper are non-adaptive.
The following is an easy corollary of the above proposition.
Corollary 7. In the above CCP and CCCP protocols for f , the players exchange c bits with the prover(s), and O (q · log (s)) bits among themselves.
OUR RESULTS
Let F s,d be the set of all functions f ∈ F2n that have an s (n) size, d (n) depth, Boolean circuit of fan-in 2. The main result of this paper is that functions in F s,d can be computed with low query and communication cost in the QCCP model, and therefore (due to Corollary 6) with low communication cost in the CCCP model.
The first theorem claims that in the QCP and CCP models, d·polylog (s) communication bits suffice in order to compute any f ∈ F s,d with high probability. The QCP part of the theorem is a restatement of the main theorem of [5] , while the CCP part of it follows as in Corollary 6.
Remark 1. In all the protocols below, the players and honest provers run in time at most poly (s).
. Then, there exists a field F of size poly (d, log (s)) and a function
and
Our next theorem shows that the computation of f ∈ F s,d can be done with even lower communication complexity in the competing provers models. The theorem offers a tradeoff between the number of rounds and the communication complexity of the protocol. Namely, for every r ∈ N, there is a protocol that computes f with high probability, and only requires r rounds and d 1 r polylog (s) communication bits.
) .
The next two theorems are easy corollaries of Theorem 9 that are obtained by taking r to extreme values. Theorem 10 takes r to be 1, and claims that f can be computed by the exchange of d · polylog (s) bits and with only a single communication round. Theorem 11 shows that by choosing
we can reduce the communication complexity of the protocol to polylog (s) at the price of having
rounds.
The next theorem claims that if f is given by a log (s)-space uniform circuit of size s and depth d, then the player(s) in Theorem 9 can be very efficient and run in time . ∀r ∈ N the claim of Theorem 9 holds with players that run in time d 1 r polylog (s) (and honest provers that run in time poly (s)), and error 2ϵ. . From now on, we omit the sub-s and write H, F, h, p, m instead of Hs, Fs, hs, ps, ms. We enumerate the layers of C such that layer 0 is the output layer and layer d is the input layer. Note that since s is the number of wires in C, the number of gates in each of the layers cannot exceed s.
PRELIMINARIES
We add gates to each of the layers of C, so that each will contain exactly h m > s gates. We label the gates in every layer by elements of H m . The gates added to every layer i (i ∈ {0, ..., d}), are all "special" gates that always return 1 We may assume, without loss of generality, that the output layer, layer 0, originally consists of a single gate whose label is now 0 m . The player's task can now be rephrased as computingṼ0 (0 m ). Let I = {0, ..., d} and L = {0, ..., 2m}. Given a set A and an element a ∈ A, we denote A−a = A\ {a}. Let ϕ ∈ F 0 be the unique zero-coordinates vector. Whenever we say that a curve or a polynomial is of degree k, we mean that it is of degree at most k. A line is a degree 1 curve.
REDUCING COMPUTATION OF LAYER
I TO LAYER I + 1
In this section we follow the lines of [5] and show that the problem of computingṼi on a point in F m can be reduced to the task of computingṼ i+1 on two points in F m , using a sum-check protocol.
5.1Ṽ i is a Quadratic Polynomial in the Values of V i+1
Let i ∈ I −d . The next lemma claims thatṼi is a degree-2 polynomial in the values of Vi+1. The reason is that sinceṼi is the low-degree extension of Vi, for every z ∈ F m , the valueṼi (z) is a linear combination of the values of Vi on H m . That is, it is a linear combination of the values of the gates of layer i. In addition, the value of a gate in layer i is a degree-2 polynomial in the values of its two children in layer i + 1.
2 → F that does not depend on the input x to the circuit, such that:
2. For every fixed w0, w1 ∈ H m , and every j ∈ [m], the function βi (z1...zm, w0, w1) is a polynomial of degree at most h − 1 in zj.
Proof Fix i ∈ I −d and let z ∈ F m . The valueṼi (z) can be written asṼ
where
Note that for every j ∈ [m] and every fixed p0 ∈ H m , the function β ′ (z1...zm, p0) is a degree h − 1 polynomial in zj. The value of gate p ∈ H m in layer i depends on the values of its two child gates in layer i + 1. Recall that every layer of C contains at least one "special" gate, that returns 1 on every input. Conclude that there exists a function c : (H m ) 3 → F (c depends on the circuit C) such that
For example, if gate p in layer i is an OR gate whose children are gates w0, w1 ∈ H m in layer i + 1, and gate w * ∈ H m in layer i + 1 is a gate that always returns 1, then
Putting it all together,Ṽ
Finally, we denote
and get
Since β ′ (z1...zm, p) is of degree at most h − 1 in zj for every j ∈ [m], it is also the case that βi is of degree at most h−1 in zj. satisfies:
ComputingṼ i GivenṼ i+1 by Sum-Check
2. Φi is of degree at most 2 (h − 1) in each of its 3m variables.
Proof 
x2m) .
Note that Φ i,ℓ (z1...zm, x1...x ℓ ) is of degree at most 2 (h − 1) in each of its m + ℓ variables, and that
Φi (z, w0, w1) = Φi,2m (z, w0 • w1) .
Also observe that a sum-check protocol can be used to reduce the computation ofṼi (z) = Φi,0 (z, ϕ) to the computation of Φi (z, w0, w1) = Φi,2m (z, w0 • w1). Sinceβi does not depend on the input to the circuit x, the player can compute Φi,2m (z, w0 • w1) by herself givenṼi+1 (w0) andṼi+1 (w1). In other words, the evaluation ofṼi on z can be reduced, by a sum-check protocol, to the computation ofṼi+1 on the pair of points w0, w1 ∈ F m .
ONE ROUND PROTOCOL
In this section we prove Theorem 10. Namely, we show that for any f ∈ F s,d it holds that f ∈ QCCP ϵ,LDEs ( 
. We describe a protocol that given a size s depth d circuit C on n bits, and an input x ∈ {0, 1} n , outputs C (x) with probability at least 1 − ϵ. The protocol consists of a single round, requires the exchange of d · polylog (s) bits, and makes a single query tox = LDEs (x).
The protocol consists of three steps: (i) The player sends questions to the provers (Subsection 6.1). (ii) The provers reply (Subsection 6.2). (iii) Using the provers' answers, the player decides on the value of C (x) (Subsection 6.4). Subsection 6.3 contains observations that are used in Subsection 6.4 in order to show the correctness of the player's decision.
We assume that one of the provers claims that C (x) = 1, while the other claims C (x) = 0. Otherwise, if both claim that C (x) = b (b ∈ {0, 1}), then since at least one of the provers is truthful, it must be the case that indeed C (x) = b. In the protocol below we assume that the player knows the identity of the prover claiming that C (x) = 1 (we call him P1), and the identity of the prover claiming that C (x) = 0 (we call him P0). This assumption is justified as the player may require each prover to add his claimed value for C (x) to his reply message.
For the rest of the section let β ∈ F\H be an arbitrary element.
Remark 2 (functions representation). During the execution of the protocol, the participants exchange a set of curves and polynomials. Each of the exchanged curves is of degree (at most) h. Each exchanged polynomial is either of the form F (r) =Ṽi (Z (r)) (i ∈ I) or of the form F (r, t) = Φ i,ℓ (Z (r) , X (t)) (i ∈ I −d , ℓ ∈ L), where Z (r) : F → F m and X (t) : F → F ℓ are two previously exchanged degree-h curves. In other words, the exchanged polynomials are all restrictions ofṼi and Φ i,ℓ to degree h curves. The polynomialṼi (z) is of degree at most h − 1 in each of its m variables, as it is the low-degree extension of Vi.
The polynomial Φ i,ℓ (z, x1...x ℓ ) is of degree at most 2 (h − 1) in each of its m + ℓ variables (see Subsection 5.2). Therefore, each exchanged polynomial is of total degree at most
We require each such polynomial to be sent in a canonical representation, as a sequence of at most 6mh 2 coefficients. Curves will be sent as sequences of polynomials.
The Player's Questions
For every i ∈ I −d , ℓ ∈ L, the player constructs a degree-h curve C i,ℓ : F → F ℓ , and a line D i,ℓ : F → F ℓ . For every i ∈ I, the player constructs a degree-2 curve Zi : F → F m , and a point zi ∈ F m . The curves Zi (i ∈ I) and C i,ℓ (i ∈ I −d , ℓ ∈ L) are given to P1, while the points zi (i ∈ I) and the lines
m . Recall that β ∈ F\H is an arbitrary element. For i = 0, ..., d − 1 we construct the additional needed curves and points in the following order:
The curves (C i,ℓ ) ℓ∈L and (D i,ℓ ) ℓ∈L are constructed recursively.
• Construct Ci,0, Di,0: Define Ci,0, Di,0 : F → F 0 by ∀t ∈ F : Ci,0 (t) = Di,0 (t) = ϕ. The point zi+1 is selected as follows. Randomly select ζi+1 ∈R F\ {0, 1}. Set zi+1 = Zi+1 (ζi+1). 
The Provers' Answers
P1's reply
For i ∈ I −d , ℓ ∈ L−0, denote by T * i,ℓ : F × F → F the polynomial T * i,ℓ (r, t) = Φ i,ℓ (Zi (r) , C i,ℓ (t)). For i ∈ I−0, denote by U * i : F → F the polynomial U * i (r) =Ṽi (Zi (r)). P1 replies with a set of polynomials T i,ℓ : F × F → F (i ∈ I −d , ℓ ∈ L−0),
P0's reply
For i ∈ I −d , ℓ ∈ L, denote by Q * i,ℓ : F → F the polynomial Q * i,ℓ (t) = Φ i,ℓ (zi, D i,ℓ (t)). P0 replies with a set of polynomials Q i,ℓ : F → F (i ∈ I −d , ℓ ∈ L). The honest P0 should reply with Q i,ℓ = Q * i,ℓ .
Propositions
This subsection contains propositions that will be useful in the analysis of the player's decision in Subsection 6.4. Propositions 1 and 2 claim that the information given to P1 by the player is independent of the pairs of values (ζi, γ i,ℓ ). Propositions 3 and 4 claim that the information given to P0 by the player is independent of the values δ i,ℓ .
Denote by I1 and I0 the random variables describing the information given to P1 and P0 (re-
, and
) . In the proofs below, whenever we say "object" we mean a field element, point or curve selected by the player while constructing the questions to the provers.
Proof Let X be a random variable consisting of all the curves Z i ′ and C i ′ ,ℓ ′ selected by the player before γ i,ℓ is selected. Let Y be a random variable consisting of all the curves Z i ′ and C i ′ ,ℓ ′ selected after γ i,ℓ . Clearly, γ i,ℓ is selected independently of X. We will show that Y is independent of the pair (X, γ i,ℓ ). This implies that I1 is independent of γ i,ℓ .
The curve D i,ℓ was selected to be a random line satisfying (γ i,ℓ ) . Therefore, for every fixed δ ∈ F\ {0}, the value D i,ℓ (δ) is uniformly distributed in F ℓ , even given all the objects selected before D i,ℓ . In particular,
The player can select all the objects selected after D i,ℓ by only knowing a i,ℓ . Since a i,ℓ is uniformly distributed in F ℓ , even given all objects selected before D i,ℓ , it holds that the objects selected after D i,ℓ are independent of all objects selected before D i,ℓ . In particular, Y is independent of the pair (X, γ i,ℓ ).
Proof Clearly, ζi is uniformly distributed, even given all the previously selected objects. In addition, all the objects selected after ζi (and after zi was set) are independent of all the objects selected up-to ζi (including ζi).
Proof Let X be a random variable consisting of all the points z i ′ and curves D i ′ ,ℓ ′ selected by the player before δ i,ℓ is selected. Let Y be a random variable consisting of all the points z i ′ and curves D i ′ ,ℓ ′ selected after δ i,ℓ . Clearly, δ i,ℓ is selected independently of X. We will show that Y is independent of the pair (X, δ i,ℓ ). This implies that I0 is independent of δ i,ℓ .
The curve C i,ℓ+1 was selected to be a random degree-h curve satisfying ∀α ∈ H : C i,ℓ+1 (α) = a i,ℓ • α. Therefore, for every fixed γ ∈ F\H, the value C i,ℓ+1 (γ) is uniformly distributed in F ℓ+1 , even given all objects selected before C i,ℓ+1 . In particular, C i,ℓ+1 (γ i,ℓ+1 ) is uniformly distributed in F ℓ+1 , even given all objects selected before C i,ℓ+1 .
The player can select all the objects selected after C i,ℓ+1 by only knowing
, even given all objects selected before C i,ℓ+1 , it holds that the objects selected after C i,ℓ+1 are independent of all objects selected before C i,ℓ+1 . In particular, Y is independent of the pair (X, δ i,ℓ ).
Proof Clearly, δi,2m is uniformly distributed, even given all the previously selected objects. In addition, all the objects selected after zi+1 are independent of all the objects selected up-to zi+1 (including zi+1). Therefore, it suffices to show that zi+1 itself is independent of all the objects selected upto δi,2m (including δi,2m).
The curve Zi+1 was selected to be a random degree-2 curve satisfying Zi+1 (0) = wi,0 and Zi+1 (1) = wi,1. Therefore, for every fixed ζ ∈ F\ {0, 1}, the value Zi+1 (ζ) is uniformly distributed in F m , even given all the objects selected before Zi+1. In particular, zi+1 = Zi+1 (ζi+1) is uniformly distributed in F m , even given all the objects selected upto δi,2m (including δi,2m).
responds with the correct polynomial T i,ℓ+1 , then the player can compute by herself the correct value of Q i,ℓ (δ i,ℓ ).
. Fix strategies for P1 and P0. Formally, a strategy for P1 is a probabilistic algorithm that gets the sets of curves Zi and C i,ℓ as inputs, and outputs the sets of polynomials T i,ℓ and Ui. A strategy for P0 is a probabilistic algorithm that gets the set of points zi and set of curves D i,ℓ as inputs, and outputs the set of polynomials Q i,ℓ . For the rest of the section probabilities will be taken over P1's random string R1, P0's random string R0, and the player's random string.
We call each of the polynomials sent by the provers a "reply polynomial". The player's decision protocol checks the correctness of the reply polynomials in a pre-determined order. Let F be a reply polynomial. Denote by EF the event that F is the first incorrect reply polynomial checked by the protocol. That is, EF is the event that all the reply polynomials checked prior to F are correct, but F is incorrect.
Proposition 6. Let F be a reply polynomial sent by P1. Let X be a random variable that is independent of the pair (I1, R1) . Then, X is independent of (I1, R1, IE F ), where IE F is the random variable that gets the value 1 if EF occurs, and 0 otherwise.
The same holds when the parts of P1 and P0 are switched.
Proof Assume that EF occurs with positive probability. P1 is dishonest as he sent an incorrect polynomial F with positive probability. Since we assume that at least one prover is honest, it must be P0. Therefore, all the reply polynomials sent by P0 are correct. This implies that the event EF depends solely on I1 and R1. That is, IE F is a function of I1 and R1. Since X is independent of (I1, R1), it is independent of (I1, R1, IE F ).
The Player's Decision
First, the player queriesx (z d ) and denote the value by v d . Note thatx = LDEs (x) =Ṽ d , and thus
Next, the player iterates over the layers of C, from the layer adjacent to the input layer (layer i = d − 1), to the output layer (layer i = 0). The iteration that handles layer i (simply referred to as "iteration i") assumes that the variable vi+1 is set to the valueṼi+1 (zi+1). The goal of iteration i is to calculate the value vi =Ṽi (zi). At the end of the loop the player returns v0, which is, supposedly, v0 =Ṽ0 (z0) = V0 (0 m ) = C (x). In order to compute vi, iteration i proceeds in a series of "check steps" (tests), each designed to check the correctness of one of the reply polynomials for layer i. Let F be a reply polynomial, and let SF be the check step designed to check F . If SF succeeds, the protocol proceeds to the next check step. If SF fails, the player outputs the value of C (x) claimed by the prover that did not send F . The reason is that we assume that at least one of the provers is honest. Since F is incorrect, the prover that did not send F must be the honest one.
Recall that EF denotes the event that F is the first incorrect reply polynomial checked by the protocol. Denote by CF the event that all reply polynomials checked up-to F (including F ) are correct. In order to prove Theorem 10 it suffices to show that for every reply polynomial F the following holds:
1. If CF occurs, then SF always succeeds.
2. If EF occurs, then with probability at least 1 − ϵ, SF fails.
3. If all the reply polynomials are correct, then the player returns C (x).
Next, we describe the check steps that compose iteration i, and show that each of them satisfies both (1) and (2). Assume for simplicity that the reply polynomial F depends on only one variable. The check step SF does the following: It computes F (σ), where σ ∈ F is a field element that cannot be predicted by the prover that sent F . It then compares F (σ) against the supposed value of F * (σ) (this latter value is computed by earlier check steps). If F is correct then F = F * , and the test succeeds. If F is incorrect, F and F * are different low-degree polynomials. Thus, it is likely that F (σ) ̸ = F * (σ), and the test is likely to fail. We assume by induction (on the layers i) that if all the reply polynomials checked by iterations d − 1, ..., i + 1 are correct, then at the beginning of iteration i it holds that vi+1 =Ṽi+1 (zi+1).
Since Ui+1 is correct, the test passes.
If EU i+1 occurs: Using Propositions 2 and 6, ζi+1 is uniformly distributed in F\ {0, 1}, even given I1, R1 and EU i+1 . Since Ui+1 only depends on I1 and R1, it holds that when EU i+1 occurs, ζi+1 is uniformly distributed, even given Ui+1.
As explained above, vi+1 = U * i+1 (ζi+1). Since Ui+1 is incorrect, Ui+1 ̸ = U * i+1 . Since both Ui+1 and U * i+1 are of degrees less than 6mh
2 (see the remark regarding functions representation at the beginning of the section), U i+1 (ζ) can only agree with U * i+1 (ζ) on less than 6mh 2 elements ζ ∈ F. Recall that when EU i+1 occurs, ζi+1 is uniformly distributed in F\ {0, 1}, even given Ui+1, and get that the probability that
. Since |F| ≥ 12mh 3 , it holds that
Calculate the supposed value ϕi,2m of Φi,2m (zi, ai,2m) = Φi (zi, wi,0 • wi,1) (see Equation 2) using Ui+1 (0) as Vi+1 (wi,0) and Ui+1 (1) asṼi+1 (wi,1). Check Qi,2m (δi,2m) = ϕi,2m. If not, return 1.
If CQ i,2m occurs: Since Ui+1 is correct Ui+1 (0) = U * i+1 (0) =Ṽi+1 (Zi+1 (0)) =Ṽi+1 (wi,0), and similarly Ui+1 (1) =Ṽi+1 (wi,1) .
Thus, ϕi,2m is set to Φi,2m (zi, ai,2m) = Φi,2m (zi, Di,2m (δi,2m)) = Q * i,2m (δi,2m). Since Qi,2m is correct, the test passes.
If EQ i,2m occurs: Using Propositions 4 and 6, δi,2m is uniformly distributed in F\ {0}, even given I0, R0 and EQ i,2m . Since Qi,2m only depends on I0 and R0, it holds that when EQ i,2m occurs, δi,2m is uniformly distributed, even given Qi,2m.
As explained above, ϕi,2m is set to Q * i,2m (δi,2m). Since Qi,2m is incorrect, Qi,2m ̸ = Q * i,2m . An argument similar to the one used in check step SU i+1 shows that the probability that Qi,2m (δi,2m) = Q * i,2m (δi,2m) = ϕi,2m is less than ϵ.
Check Ti,2m.
Check Ti,2m (ζi, γi,2m) = Qi,2m (0). If not, return 0. If CT i,2m occurs:
Since Qi,2m and Ti,2m are correct, the test passes.
If ET i,2m occurs: Using Propositions 1, 2 and 6, the pair (ζi, γi,2m) is uniformly distributed in (F\ {0, 1}) × (F\H), even given I1, R1 and ET i,2m . Since Ti,2m only depends on I1 and R1, it holds that when ET i,2m occurs, the pair (ζi, γi,2m) is uniformly distributed, even given Ti,2m.
Since Qi,2m is correct but Ti,2m is incorrect, it holds that Qi,2m = Q * i,2m and Ti,2m ̸ = T * i,2m . Using the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, since both Ti,2m and T * i,2m
are of total degree less than 6mh 2 (see the remark regarding functions representation at the beginning of the section), Ti,2m (ζ, γ) can only agree with T * i,2m (ζ, γ) on less than
Recall that when ET i,2m occurs, the pair (ζi, γi,2m) is uniformly distributed in (F\ {0, 1}) × (F\H), even given Ti,2m, and get that the probability that Ti,2m
Since |F| ≥ 12mh 3 , it holds that
Check Qi,2m−1. Set vi = Qi,0 (β). Note that if Qi,0 is correct then using
, and the induction hypothesis holds. In particular, if all reply polynomials are correct then v0 =Ṽ0 (z0) = V0 (0 m ) = C (x).
TRADE-OFF PROTOCOL
In this section we prove Theorem 9. We describe a protocol that given a size s depth d circuit C on n bits, and an input x ∈ {0, 1} n , outputs C (x) with probability at least 1−ϵ. The new protocol uses the one-round protocol described in Section 6 as a building block. The new protocol consists of r rounds, requires the exchange of d . Thus, after r − 1 rounds we are left with a range of at most
The provers agree on a point on the input layer LDEs (x ′ ) =Ṽ i ′ of C ′ , but disagree on a point on the output layerṼ i ′′ of C ′ . Stage 2 of the new protocol (Subsection 7.2) runs the oneround protocol described in Section 6 with C ′ and x ′ as inputs in order to determine which of the provers is truthful.
Stage 1: Search
First, the player constructs questions for the provers as in Subsection 6.1. That is, the player constructs the
, and the curves Zi and points zi (i ∈ I). For i ∈ I, let U * i : F → F be the function U * i (r) =Ṽi (Zi (r)), and let u * i ∈ F be the value u * i =Ṽi (zi). Next, the protocol proceeds in r−1 search rounds. In each round the player constructs a set of k indices M ⊆ I (M contains indices that partition the remaining search range into almost equal parts). The player sends the curves Zi (i ∈ M ) to P1, and the points zi (i ∈ M ) to P0. P1 replies with the functions Ui : F → F (i ∈ M ), and P0 replies with the values ui ∈ F (i ∈ M ). The honest P1 should reply with Ui = U * i , and the honest P0 should reply with ui = u * i . The goal of Stage 1 is to find two layers i
By comparing the values of Ui (ζi) and ui (i ∈ M ), the player decides on the smaller search range for the next round, until the desired layers i ′ and i ′′ are found. Note that during the first round the player checks the provers agreement on the input and output layers. If U0 (ζ0) = u0 (the provers agree on the output C (x)), then since at least one of the provers is truthful, the player outputs u0. If 
Stage 2: Run the One-Round Protocol
Let C ′ be the circuit composed of layers i ′ , ..., i ′′ of C. Run the one-round protocol on C ′ and x ′ = Vi, using the questions that were already constructed in Stage 1, and with the following changes. Return the obtained value.
• Instead of querying LDEs (x ′ ) at the point z i ′ , use the value u i ′ .
• Instead of returning the computed value v0 in the last step, return 0 if v0 = u i ′′ and 1 otherwise.
VERY EFFICIENT PLAYER
In this section we prove Theorem 12. That is, we assume in addition to the previous assumptions that the circuit C is log (s)-space uniform and show that in this case the player can run in time d 1 r polylog (s). First observe that each of the check steps of the protocol described in Section 6, excluding the check steps SQ i,2m (i ∈ I −d ), can be preformed by the player in polylog (s) time and without knowing the circuit C. The only check steps that require knowing the circuit C are the check steps SQ i,2m (i ∈ I −d ), as explained next.
The check step SQ i,2m (i ∈ I −d ) requires the player to compute the value Φi (zi, wi,0, wi,1) given the (supposed) values ofṼi+1 (wi,0) andṼi+1 (wi,1).
Recall that Φi was defined in Lemma 14 as Φi (z, w0, w1) = βi (z, w0, w1)Ṽi+1 (w0)Ṽi+1 (w1) . Therefore, in order to compute Φi (zi, wi,0, wi,1), the player needs to know βi (zi, wi,0, wi,1). Note thatβi depends on the circuit C, and that for a general size s depth d circuit C, the evaluation ofβi may be pricy and require poly (s) time. Moreover, even in the case where the circuit C is log (s)-space uniform, the evaluation ofβi by the player may require poly (s) time.
The crucial observation is that in the case of a log (s)-space uniform circuit C, the functionβi is computable in space O (log (s)). Note, that the inputs for the functionβi are themselves of length O (log (s)). Hence, the functionβi can be computed in space polynomial in the length of its inputs, that isβi ∈ PSPACE.
Recall that for every language in PSPACE, Feige and Kilian give a one-round competing provers protocol that only requires polynomial communication complexity [3] . Therefore, there is a one-round competing provers protocol that computesβi, with communication complexity polynomial in the length of the inputs forβi, that is, communication complexity of polylog (s). Thus, the player cannot evaluate the functionβi in time polylog (s) by herself, but she can do that with the help of the two competing provers.
This naturally leads to an r + 2 rounds protocol (rather than the r rounds protocol that we want). We start by describing the r + 2 rounds protocol and then show how to collapse the last two rounds of the protocol to round r of the protocol. 
